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Fast or Accurate? The Change of Goals Modulates  
the Efficiency of Executive Control 
Abstract: In the present study, we analyse the influence of goal maintenance and goal change on the efficiency of 
executive control. Although there is empirical evidence on the impact of goal maintenance and task-switching on 
executive control, little is known about the consequences of changing between processing goals (e.g., speed or accuracy 
goals). We assessed the influence of changing between speed and accuracy goals while performing a task-switching 
procedure that requires social categorization. Experiment 1 included frequent goal changes, whereas Experiment 2 
included one goal change across the experimental session. The results showed that both goals influence general 
performance and flexibility. A comparison between experiments suggested that frequent goal change (Experiment 1) 
resulted in worse performance and lower flexibility overall, compared to sequential goal change (Experiment 2). 
Frequent goal change was also associated with increased difficulties in pursuing the accuracy goal. The implications 
regarding the role of goal maintenance and goal change on executive control are discussed, as well as new research 
possibilities. 
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FAST OR ACCURATE? THE CHANGE 
OF GOALS MODULATES THE EFFICIENCY 
OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
Goals represent subjectively desirable states that 
individuals try to accomplish through action (Kruglanski, 
1996). They impact several aspects of human lives, such as 
academic performance (Morisano et al., 2010; Zimmerman 
et al., 1992), job satisfaction (Maier & Brunstein, 2001), or 
habit acquisition (e.g., Wood & Neal, 2007; Wood 
& Rünger, 2016). Moreover, goals also influence the 
way individuals process different types of information 
(e.g., Krajewski et al., 2011; Moskowitz, 2002; Peterman, 
1997), and have been shown to affect general cognitive 
processes, such as executive control (Botvinick & Braver, 
2015). 
Executive control refers to the superordinate cogni-
tive functions that regulate the expression of our behaviour 
(for a review, see Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). It includes the 
update of working memory representations, switching 
between tasks or mental sets, and the inhibition of 
prepotent responses (Miyake et al., 2000). The functioning 
of these cognitive processes has been widely analysed in 
the field of cognitive science (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; 
Banich, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, 2012; 
Koechlin et al., 2003; Ye & Zhou, 2009; Yuan & Raz, 
2014). However, although the efficiency of executive 
control depends on different goal-driven motivations (for 
a review, see Botvinick & Braver, 2015), little is still 
known about how these motivational processes interact 
with executive control. More specifically, what are the 
motives that prompt executive control, and how these 
motives affect different aspects of executive control, such 
as information processing, effort, general performance, or 
task outcome (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Locke & Latham, 
2002). 
The role of motivation in executive control has been 
studied primarily from a reward-based perspective (e.g., 
Dixon & Christoff, 2012; Kleinsorge & Rinkenauer, 2012; 
Westbrook et al., 2013), with the focus on executive 
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control tasks that involve selective attention (Padmala 
& Pessoa, 2011), response inhibition (Leotti & Wagner, 
2010), or task switching (Kleinsorge & Rinkenauer, 2012), 
but the evidence on the impact of other types of 
motivations is very limited. To understand how executive 
control influences our behaviour, it is necessary to 
comprehend how different goals impact executive control, 
and to grasp not only the impact of a current goal, but also 
the process of changing goals. This study aimed at 
analysing the impact of both goal maintenance and goal 
change on executive control. 
The Influence of Goals on Executive Control 
The importance of executive control in our lives is 
undeniable. It regulates basic processes as attention or 
language, and it coordinates our behaviour towards 
specific actions (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Researchers 
from various fields, including cognitive science, language, 
memory, neuropsychology, or neuroscience, have studied 
this topic for decades (e.g., Adrover-Roig et al., 2012; 
Aron et al., 2004; Braver, 2012; Hernández et al., 2010; Ye 
& Zhou, 2009). However, there is still a piece of the puzzle 
missing: What drives executive control? What are the 
reasons behind the exertion of executive control? As 
Botvinick and Braver (2015) highlighted in their review, 
“control is motivated”. The decision to exert executive 
control is guided by different goals, which also influence 
the level of effort, persistence, and performance during 
executive control tasks. 
As introduced before, goals impact engagement and 
performance during executive control tasks. However, the 
way in which a goal influences executive control may 
depend on its properties. One of such properties is goals’ 
hierarchical organization (e.g., for a review, see Austin 
& Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Elliot 
& Church, 1997; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Goals 
are organized according to their level of abstraction, with 
specific, lower-level goals at the bottom, and more 
abstract, pocessing goals that are higher in the hierarchy 
(e.g., Grant & Gelety, 2009). Lower-level goals are usually 
framed in the general task instructions and indicate what 
needs to be done to complete the task. Without these 
lower-level goals, it is impossible to perform the task 
correctly, and therefore their active representation and 
maintenance is crucial. For example, task-switching 
paradigms require participants to perform one out of two 
discrete tasks on each experimental trial (e.g., to indicate 
whether a shape is a triangle or a circle; to indicate whether 
a shape is red or blue), and each of those tasks represents 
a lower-level goal. Processing goals, on the other hand, 
indicate how the task should be completed (e.g., respond-
ing fast or slow, processing the information deeply 
or shallowly, cooperating with others or competing, 
expressing or inhibiting specific beliefs). They are not 
directly linked to the general task instructions, but 
influence how individuals self-regulate their behaviour 
during the task. 
In general, studies on executive control have 
considered lower-level goals typically as part of task 
instructions. Within this context, there is evidence on the 
impact of lower-level goals on task-switching (for reviews, 
see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003), the Stroop task (for 
a review, see MacLeod, 1991), or the Simon task (for 
a review, see Lu & Proctor, 1995). However, the effects of 
higher-level goals (e.g., processing goals) on performance 
have been rarely investigated. Notable exceptions can be 
found in the field of social and motivational psychology, 
with the main focus on the relation between epistemic 
motivation and executive control (e.g., Kossowska et al., 
2014; Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009). Need for closure 
(NFC), an epistemic motivation that focuses on knowledge 
formation processes, can be defined as a desire for a firm 
answer to a question, in opposition to ambiguity 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). High levels of NFC – 
both as a state and as a trait – are related to lower 
interference and greater inhibition of irrelevant stimuli 
when performing executive control tasks (Kossowska, 
2007a; Kossowska et al., 2014), although they are also 
linked to heuristic processing strategies (Bukowski et al., 
2013), and even with difficulties in the processing of 
information when the cognitive load imposed by the task is 
high (Kossowska, 2007b; Kossowska et al., 2014; Roets et 
al., 2008). For example, Bukowski et al. (2013) found that 
individuals with higher levels of NFC, both dispositional 
and induced, were less accurate when reasoning about 
social relations because they relied more on information 
that was consistent with their background knowledge. In 
another study, Kossowska et al. (2014) discovered that 
induced high NFC (via two processing goals, to be fast or 
to be accurate) was linked to faster responses and smaller 
switch costs on a switching task, but also to lower 
accuracy when the task demands were higher. None-
theless, attaining closure was not necessary to adequately 
pursue the lower-level goals of the task (i.e., to categorize 
faces according to their age or to their gender). 
To sum up, besides the lower-level goals that are 
related to task instructions, both personal goals (e.g., to 
attain closure) and experimentally induced processing 
goals (e.g., to respond fast) play an important role in the 
processing strategies during an executive control task. 
They also seem critical in the ability to cope with events 
that require different degrees of flexibility. In general, 
research on executive control has taken into account the 
task goals that are triggered by general task instructions 
(i.e., lower-level goals), but less attention has been devoted 
to studying the influence of the change between processing 
goals on executive control. 
Goal Maintenance and Goal Change 
For goals to impact executive control efficiency, they 
must be activated and maintained over time; the mere 
presentation of a goal does not ensure its pursuit and 
attainment (Braver et al., 2002). The process of goal 
maintenance has been considered in the majority of 
executive control studies that analysed the impact 
of lower-level goals in response inhibition or information 
update (e.g., in the Stroop task, to name the colour 
and ignore the word; in the letter memory task, to 
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remember the last letters of a list). In broad terms, when 
the lower-level goal is maintained, the task is performed 
correctly. 
However, goals are not static and unchangeable over 
time. People disengage from some of their goals and re- 
engage in new ones, adapting their behaviour accordingly. 
The changing environments in which we live require 
constant adjustment, and individuals must be able to 
flexibly switch to a new goal when required (Altamirano 
et al., 2010). The concept of goal change includes two 
processes: goal disengagement, that is, the reduction 
of behavioural efforts and the decrease in psychological 
commitment toward a goal (Wrosch et al., 2013), and goal 
reengagement, understood as the identification, commit-
ment, and pursuit of new goals (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, 
et al., 2003). Although there are individual differences in 
goal disengagement capacity (e.g., Brandtstädter & Re-
nner, 1990; Wrosch, 2011; Wrosch et al., 2007; Wrosch, 
Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003), the goal disengagement 
process tends to be more effective when an alternative 
goal is available (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003), 
that is, when individuals activate and maintain a new 
goal. Goal disengagement and reengagement have been 
previously studied in relation to self-regulation pro-
cesses and well-being, both in healthy (van Randen-
borgh et al., 2010; Wrosch, 2011; Wrosch et al., 2006; 
Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, 
Miller, et al., 2003) and in clinical populations (e.g., Neter 
et al., 2009; O’Connor et al., 2009; O’Connor et al., 
2012). 
One area in which goal disengagement and reengage-
ment occur frequently is during multitasking. Multitasking 
has been defined as carrying out two or more tasks at the 
same time (Bühner et al., 2006). Nowadays, multitasking 
is part of our everyday lives in many environments, as 
school, work, or home (Bühner et al., 2006), especially 
with the development of modern technology platforms 
(e.g., Courage et al., 2015). From a goal perspective, 
multitasking requires constant goal change, since indivi-
duals must juggle between the goal representation of each 
task (e.g., Verbruggen et al., 2008), and these goal changes 
have consequences in everyday activities, even when the 
changes are voluntary (Junco & Cotten, 2012; Lau, 2017). 
Apart from its impact on daily activities, multitasking has 
been associated with a detriment in performance during 
tasks that require executive control (e.g., Adler & Benbu-
nan-Fich, 2012; Arrington & Logan, 2004; Gollan 
& Ferreira, 2009), with the majority of evidence coming 
from task-switching studies (Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 
2003). Task-switching paradigms require participants to 
update constantly their mental representations to fulfil the 
task requirements, maintaining the task goals but also 
switching between them. Following the example from the 
previous section, the constant change between the two 
lower-level goals of categorizing figures by colour or 
shape has a negative impact on performance, with slower 
responses and more errors when it is necessary to switch 
between the two task goals compared to when the task is 
repeated (Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003). Switching 
between the tasks can take place in a fixed sequence (e.g., 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995), or in a random sequence (e.g., 
Meiran, 1996). The interval between the response and the 
stimulus in the first case, and between the cue and the 
stimulus in the second case, can be manipulated, providing 
preparatory times that differ in their length. In general, 
larger preparatory times reduce the cost of switching (e.g., 
Hoffmann et al., 2003; Meiran, 1996; Nieuwenhuis 
& Monsell, 2002; Rogers & Mosell, 1995), especially 
under random switch conditions (Tornay & Milán, 2001). 
However, even with long preparatory times, this cost is not 
eliminated (Monsell, 2003). Although studies on task- 
switching provide a whole body of evidence on the impact 
of switching between task goals on executive control, the 
evidence is limited in the sense that they do not measure 
the impact of proactive change between processing goals 
(i.e., the voluntary change from the current processing goal 
to another processing goal), but focus instead on the 
impact of switching between lower-level goals (i.e., task 
goals). 
What is the relation between goal maintenance and 
goal change? To explain the dynamic nature of persistence 
and flexibility that could be extrapolated to the concepts of 
goal maintenance and change, Hommel (2015) introduced 
the Metacontrol State Model. According to this model, 
persistence and flexibility act as two counteracting forces 
that must be balanced to ensure adaptive behaviour: 
Persistence facilitates focusing on relevant information but 
at the risk of ignoring other effective possibilities, whereas 
flexibility facilitates switching but at the risk of increased 
distraction and interference. The concepts of goal main-
tenance and goal change could be understood in a similar 
manner, that is, to ensure correct performance, we must be 
flexible and ready to change to a new goal without 
neglecting our current goal, finding the optimal balance 
between maintenance and change. Based on this idea, goal 
maintenance and goal change should not be considered as 
two separate processes, and their interaction must be 
evaluated when assessing the efficiency of executive 
control. 
In conclusion, to understand the way in which goals 
influence executive control, it is worth examining jointly 
the goals’ properties (i.e., their hierarchical organization) 
and the dynamics between the processes of goal main-
tenance and goal change. Therefore, we propose to 
investigate the influence of proactive change between 
processing goals on executive control, or, in other words, 
how the voluntary change from one processing goal to 
another (e.g., from a speed goal to an accuracy goal) 
impacts an important aspect of executive control, which is 
cognitive flexibility. 
The Present Study 
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of goal 
maintenance and goal change on the efficiency of 
executive control and, more specifically, task switching. 
For that reason, we modified a task-switching paradigm to 
include two processing goals, speed and accuracy, and we 
tested young adults, a group that is at the peak of their 
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cognitive resources and exerts executive control at an 
optimal level (Karbach & Verhaeghen, 2014; Zelazo et al., 
2004). So far, studies have analysed the impact of deficient 
goal maintenance in executive control tasks among healthy 
ageing (e.g., De Jong, 2001; Paxton et al., 2008) and 
clinical population, mostly suffering from dementia (e.g., 
Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2008; Rogers et al., 1998). 
However, older adults and individuals with some clinical 
pathologies have more difficulties to perform executive 
control tasks, and therefore the procedures used in these 
studies might not be sensitive enough to detect differences 
in individuals with high executive functions, for instance, 
healthy young adults. Moreover, the majority of these 
studies focus on specific task goals (i.e., lower-level goals, 
e.g., to indicate the direction of an arrow) and not on 
processing goals (i.e. higher-level goals, e.g., to respond 
quick or slow). As such, testing young adults serves not 
only the purpose of this study, but will also facilitate future 
research in other populations that differ in their levels of 
executive control, for example, bilinguals (e.g., Marzecová 
et al., 2013; Prior & MacWhinney, 2010; but see also 
Lehtonen et al., 2018), or musicians (e.g., Román- 
Caballero et al., 2020). 
Although many tasks have been developed to 
measure the different components of executive control, 
we focused on the Social Category Switching Task (SCST, 
Marzecová et al., 2013), a task-switching paradigm that 
involves social stimuli and requires the categorization of 
faces according to their age (i.e., old vs. young) or their 
gender (i.e., male vs. female). The choice of the task was 
threefold. Firstly, we focus on category switching and 
flexibility as it seems that this aspect of executive control 
should be particularly prone to goal changes. Secondly, the 
processing of social information is strongly automatized, 
therefore switching between different social categories is 
more demanding in terms of cognitive flexibility than 
switching between non-social stimuli, as geometric shapes 
(Bukowski et al., 2019; Ito, 2011). Thirdly, the SCST has 
been used previously to measure the impact of induced 
goal-driven motivations (Kossowska et al., 2014) and 
turned out to be quite successful in this respect. 
The SCST measures the flexibility of switching 
between two mental sets (i.e., switching between age and 
gender categorization rules). Switching from one categor-
ization rule to the other requires higher levels of cognitive 
flexibility, which can be measured via switch costs, that is, 
the difference in reaction times between the trials in which 
switching between categorization rules is required, and the 
trials in which the same categorization rule is applied. 
Apart from the general levels of flexibility, the SCST 
measures also the flexibility required to manage the 
stimulus-set binding or, in other words, the association 
between a specific face and a categorization rule. The task- 
switching flexibility depends on the number of stimulus’ 
features that are repeated from trial to trial, being harder to 
switch when the two features are repeated in two 
consecutive trials (e.g., two young women), compared to 
when they change partially (e.g., one young woman and 
one old woman), or completely (e.g., one young woman 
and one old man). In the study by Kossowska et al. (2014), 
that investigated the impact of induced goal-driven 
motivations on SCST performance, the authors found that 
participants who followed the speed goal had faster 
responses and smaller switch costs in reaction times. 
However, they also made more errors under the experi-
mental conditions that involved a partial or complete 
change in the stimulus and therefore required higher levels 
of flexibility. On the other hand, the group of participants 
that followed the accuracy goal made fewer errors when 
the flexibility demands of the task were higher (i.e., partial 
repetition and complete alternation conditions), but at the 
cost of slower responses and larger switch costs. The 
results from this study show that the two goals led to the 
classical speed-accuracy trade-off, and that the influence 
of these two goals in performance was not restricted only 
to changes on average reaction times and accuracy, but 
also influenced other cognitive processes, as cognitive 
flexibility. Nonetheless, they measured only the impact of 
the maintenance of one processing goal, without including 
any goal change. In our study, we manipulated the same 
two goals, but adding the component of goal disengage-
ment and reengagement. 
In sum, our aim was to analyse the impact of goal 
maintenance and goal change on executive control and, 
more specifically, on cognitive flexibility, by adapting an 
existing task-switching procedure that would be sensitive 
enough to detect differences among young healthy adults. 
For that, we modified the SCST to include the manipula-
tion of two processing goals: speed and accuracy. The 
obtained results should be useful not only for the 
understanding of executive control processes per se, but 
also other daily behaviours that are driven by goals, such 
as habit acquisition and change, or multitasking. 
For the two experiments presented in this manuscript, 
we report how we determined our sample size, all data 
exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures (Simmons 
et al., 2012). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, participants completed a task- 
switching paradigm in which two processing goals were 
induced via instructions: to focus on speed or accuracy. 
The goals were presented sequentially to participants, that 
is, the change of the goal took place between each 
experimental block. We hypothesized a differential impact 
of each goal in performance, with shorter reaction times 
and smaller switch costs in reaction times when the speed 
goal was induced, but at the cost of lower accuracy 
(Kossowska et al., 2014), and higher levels of accuracy 
when the accuracy goal was induced, but at the cost of 
larger reaction times and switch costs in reaction times. In 
addition to our main hypothesis, we explored the influence 
of speed and accuracy goals on the ability to update the 
available information, that is, how these two goals might 
modulate the control of the interference driven by changes 
in the task and in the stimuli. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-seven adults participated in this study1 (35 fe-
males, 12 males), with a mean age of 28 years (SD = 9.04). 
Participants were recruited through an online advertise-
ment or via the university students’ pool, and gave their 
informed consent to participate in the study. They received 
either money or course credits in exchange for their 
participation. This study complies with APA ethical 
standards and was approved by the ethical commission 
of Jagiellonian University. 
Goal Manipulation 
Participants completed a total of 6 experimental 
blocks of the SCST (Marzecová et al., 2013) following one 
of two goals: speed or accuracy. Goals were alternated 
between blocks, meaning that participants changed from 
one goal to the other after each block (see Figure 1). 
Before each new block, they received written instructions 
on the goal to follow. Specifically, before starting an 
accuracy block, participants were given the following 
instructions: “In this part of the experiment, you will earn 
points by responding as correctly as you can, without 
making mistakes. It is very important to do this task the 
best you can, analysing all the information, even if it takes 
you more time. To obtain a good result, you must answer 
as correctly as possible, without making mistakes”. On the 
other hand, before each speed block, participants received 
these instructions: “In this part of the experiment you will 
earn points by responding as fast as you can. It is very 
important to do this task as quickly as possible, without 
analysing the information deeply. To obtain a good result, 
you must answer as quickly as possible”. The goal order 
was counterbalanced between participants. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The SCST is a cognitive task designed to test the 
ability to switch between two social categories (Marzecová 
et al., 2013). In this task, participants must categorize 
pictures of human faces according to their age (old vs. 
young) or their gender (male vs. female). Eight white-and- 
black photographs depicting a young male, an old male, 
a young female and an old female (two pictures per 
category) were selected from The center for vital longevity 
database (Minear & Park, 2004). All photographs had 
a width of 7.41 cm and a height of 6.74 cm and were 
displayed at the centre of the screen. On each trial, a visual 
cue (a green or purple coloured frame) informed 
participants of which task they should perform (age or 
gender categorization). Both tasks were presented on 
a random order to participants. The colour-task combina-
tion was counterbalanced, and the task was programmed 
using E-prime software (Schneider et al., 2002). 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross for 1000 ms. Afterwards, the target picture was 
displayed in the middle of the screen, surrounded by either 
a purple or a green coloured frame. The cue and the target 
were presented simultaneously on each trial, that is, 
participants had no preparatory time between the cue and 
the target. Both remained on the screen until participants 
responded, or for a maximum duration of 3000 ms. The 
intertrial interval was 1500 ms, and participants received 
auditory feedback after errors (independently on the goal 
they followed). No feedback for correct responses was 
provided to avoid interference with the task switch 
manipulation and to not alter the original procedure 
beyond the goal manipulation. To respond, participants 
pressed the “z” and the “m” keys for the gender task, and 
the “x” and “n” keys for the age task. The matching of the 
keys to category exemplars was also counterbalanced 
across participants, and the stimuli were presented 
randomly to each participant. 
First, participants completed a practice block of eight 
trials, followed by 6 experimental blocks of 80 trials each. 
In half of the blocks, participants were instructed to follow 
the accuracy goal, whereas in the other half they were 
instructed to follow the speed goal (see Figure 1). Before 
each experimental block, they received specific written 
instructions on the goal to follow. 
Design and Data Analysis 
Two within-subjects variables were considered for the 
confirmatory analysis: goal and task switch. The goal vari-
able (speed vs. accuracy) was related to the particular goal 
participants were required to follow, and the task switch 
variable (switch vs. no switch) referred to whether partici-
pants had to switch between tasks on two consecutive trials 
(e.g., to categorize by age in the first trial and by gender in 
the second), or whether the task remained identical. 
Figure 1. Experimental design of Experiment 1 (Top) and Experiment 2 (Bottom) 
Note. In Experiment 1, participants completed 6 experimental blocks changing from one goal to another after each block. They received auditory 
feedback after errors in all blocks. In Experiment 2, participants completed two practice blocks with no goal manipulation, followed by two blocks 
dedicated to each goal. They received auditory feedback after errors during the practice blocks, and written feedback after each block during the 
experimental blocks. The written feedback indicated either the average reaction time (for speed blocks) or the average accuracy rate (for accuracy 
blocks). The goal order was counterbalanced across participants in both experiments. 
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Apart from the confirmatory analysis, we conducted 
an exploratory analysis to investigate the influence of 
goals in the processing of task-driven and stimulus-driven 
interference. In other words, we explored whether 
participants' ability to update the stimulus-set binding 
(i.e., the association between a specific stimulus and 
a task) was different when following the speed versus the 
accuracy goal. For this analysis, two other variables were 
considered: task and type of repetition. The task variable 
(age vs. gender) referred to under which category 
participants had to categorize the faces, and the type of 
repetition variable (complete repetition vs. partial repeti-
tion vs. complete alternation) referred to the number of 
features that were repeated in two consecutive trials: under 
the complete repetition condition, the two pictures shared 
the same features (e.g., a “young female” was followed by 
another “young female”); under the partial repetition 
condition, only one feature was repeated (e.g., a “young 
woman” was followed by an “old woman”), and under the 
complete alternation condition, the opposite features were 
presented (e.g., a “young woman” was followed by an “old 
man”). The task switch and the type of repetition variables 
were coded offline. All analyses were implemented in 
R using the stats package (version 4.0.0, R Core Team, 
2020), pairwise comparisons were computed with the 
package emmeans (version 1.5.2-1, Lenth, 2020), and 
partial Eta-squared was calculated with the DescTools 
package (version 0.99.36, Signorell et al., 2016). Plots 




Two participants were excluded due to a lower 
accuracy rate (< 30%). Therefore, analyses were con-
ducted with data from 45 participants. Erroneous responses 
and reaction times (RTs) shorter than 200 ms and longer 
than 2000 ms2, as well as the first trial of each block3, were 
excluded from the analysis (altogether 14.26%). The 
8 practice trials were also removed. On average and per 
participant, 412 trials from the total 480 trials remained 
after filtering (SD = 48.21; range = 264 – 465)4. The 
proportion of valid trials for the conditions goal and task 
switch can be consulted in the Appendix, Table A, and the 
distribution of reaction times after filtering is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
To test our main hypothesis, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with two within-subject factors: goal 
(speed vs. accuracy) and task switch (switch vs. no 
switch). The analysis revealed a main effect of goal, F(1, 
44) = 53.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .55, and a main effect of task 
switch, F(1, 44) = 122.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .74, but no 
significant interaction, F(1, 44) = 0.19, p = .66, ηp2 = .00. 
As expected, participants responded faster during the 
speed blocks compared to the accuracy blocks (M = 955 
ms vs. M = 1076 ms; see Figure 3), and in non-switch trials 
than in switch trials (M = 952 ms vs. M = 1079 ms), but 
there were no differences in switch costs between the goals 
(Mspeed = 129 ms vs. Maccuracy = 125 ms). 
To test the impact of goals on the control of task- 
driven and stimulus-driven interference, we ran another 
ANOVA including the task (age vs. gender) and the type 
of repetition (complete repetition vs. partial repetition vs. 
complete alternation) as within-subject factors. Apart from 
the main effect of goal, F(1, 44) = 52.08, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.54, none of the effects of interest involving goal reached 
significance. However, the absence of interactions in this 
exploratory analysis needs to be considered with caution 
due to the sample size. The observed means in all 
conditions can be consulted in Table 1, and the complete 
exploratory analysis is summarized in the Appendix, 
Table B.                       
Figure 2. Distribution of Filtered Reaction Times (Left) and Average Error Rates (Right) per Participant  
as a Function of the Goals in Experiment 1 
Note. The figures represent raincloud plots (Allen et al., 2019) of reaction times (RTs) and error rates as a function of the goals (accuracy, speed). For 
each goal, the raincloud plot combines jittered points (i.e., randomly separated points, left) with a half violin plot (right). The half violin plot represents 
the probability density function (i.e., the probability of a given value within the population), and the jittered points are, in this case, either individual 
filtered RTs, or average error rates per participant and goal. Lines represent one standard deviation above and below the mean. Filtered RTs included 
correct responses that were longer than 200 ms and shorter than 2000 ms. The first trial of each block was also removed for RTs and error rates. 
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Error Rates 
The mean error rate was 8.40%. The first trial of each 
block was removed and, as for the RTs, we conducted 
a repeated measures ANOVA with two within-subject 
factors: goal and task switch (see Figure 2 for the 
distribution of the average error rates per participant and 
goal). The analysis revealed a main effect of goal, F(1, 44) 
= 5.45, p = .024, ηp2 = .11, with more errors when the 
speed goal was salient (M = 9.13% vs. M = 7.41%; see 
Figure 3), and a main effect of task switch, F(1, 44) = 
11.28, p = .002, ηp2 = .20, with more errors in switching 
trials versus non-switching trials (M = 9.33% vs. M = 
7.21%).The interaction between goal and task switch was 
not significant, F(1, 44) = 1.56, p = .22, ηp2 = .03, with no 
differences in switch costs when following the speed or the 
accuracy goal (Mspeed = 2.58% vs. Maccuracy = 1.66%). 
Again, we conducted a subsequent analysis to explore 
the impact of goals on the processing of task-driven and 
stimulus-driven interference. For that, we ran an ANOVA 
including the task and the type of repetition as within- 
Table 1 Observed Means (and Standard Deviations) for Reaction Times and Error Rates for all Experimental 
Conditions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2     
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Goal Task Repetition type Task switch Reaction time (ms) Error rate (%) 
Reaction time 
(ms) Error rate (%) 
Accuracy Age Complete  alternation No switch 1092 (352) 7.31 (26.05) 978 (327) 3.41 (18.16)    
Switch 1166 (369) 10.80 (31.06) 1040 (321) 3.46 (18.29)   
Complete  
repetition No switch 896 (332) 3.13 (17.41) 825 (282) 0.77 (8.77)    
Switch 1170 (343) 10.36 (30.49) 1038 (321) 5.91 (23.61)   
Partial repetition No switch 1026 (352) 8.79 (28.33) 954 (324) 2.68 (16.15)    
Switch 1165 (358) 8.96 (28.57) 1025 (330) 3.25 (17.75)  
Gender Complete  alternation No switch 1064 (323) 8.39 (27.74) 975 (313) 2.88 (16.75)    
Switch 1073 (348) 8.02 (27.17) 1033 (329) 1.77 (13.20)   
Complete  
repetition No switch 879 (307) 2.59 (15.90) 828 (305) 0.77 (8.77)    
Switch 1087 (337) 5.09 (22.00) 971 (323) 2.72 (16.29)   
Partial repetition No switch 1045 (345) 6.66 (24.94) 945 (322) 1.41 (11.79)    
Switch 1108 (350) 6.56 (24.76) 1021 (328) 2.69 (16.18) 
Speed Age Complete  alternation No switch 950 (350) 7.48 (26.32) 852 (335) 9.84 (29.82)    
Switch 1023 (360) 11.88 (32.38) 922 (331) 12.53 (33.14)   
Complete  
repetition No switch 768 (289) 2.53 (15.72) 708 (266) 2.62 (15.99)    
Switch 1024 (367) 12.15 (32.69) 907 (331) 11.34 (31.75)   
Partial  
repetition No switch 910 (330) 11.47 (31.87) 829 (308) 9.60 (29.48)    
Switch 1035 (371) 11.33 (31.70) 899 (326) 10.66 (30.87)  
Gender Complete  alternation No switch 954 (310) 8.58 (28.03) 870 (308) 4.78 (21.37)    
Switch 994 (357) 7.63 (26.56) 862 (320) 6.80 (25.21)   
Complete  
repetition No switch 772 (308) 3.22 (17.67) 712 (300) 4.11 (19.88)    
Switch 969 (327) 10.17 (30.25) 855 (322) 8.02 (27.19)   
Partial  
repetition No switch 911 (337) 9.08 (28.74) 797 (310) 6.83 (25.23)    
Switch 971 (343) 8.81 (28.36) 891 (337) 7.73 (26.71) 
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subject factors. As in the confirmatory analysis, the main 
effect of goal was significant, F(1, 44) = 5.22, p = .027, 
ηp2 = .11. The three-way interaction between goal, task 
switch and repetition type was also significant, F(2, 88) = 
3.38, p = .038, ηp2 = .07, and therefore we calculated the 
switch costs for each type of repetition and goal. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that participants had larger switch 
costs when following the speed goal than when following 
the accuracy goal, but only when the features of the 
stimulus were repeated in two consecutive trials, t(132) = 
-3.054, p = .003 (Mspeed= 8.49% vs. Maccuracy = 4.77%). 
As with the reaction time exploratory analysis, the results 
from this analysis should be interpreted with caution, due 
to the sample size. The observed means in all conditions 
can be consulted in Table 1, and the complete exploratory 
analysis is summarized in the Appendix, Table B. 
Discussion 
Within this experiment, we explored the impact of 
goal changes on performance during a task-switching 
paradigm. For that, we asked participants to complete the 
SCST while following a specific processing goal (to focus 
on speed or accuracy). Goals were manipulated within- 
subjects, and participants had to change goals after each 
experimental block. For the speed goal, we predicted faster 
responses and smaller switch costs in reaction times but at 
the cost of reduced accuracy, whereas for the accuracy 
goal, the opposite pattern was expected, that is, fewer 
errors but larger RTs and switch costs. 
The results partially support our hypothesis: Partici-
pants responded faster but also made more errors when the 
speed goal was salient compared to when the accuracy 
goal was salient. This suggests that following a speed or an 
accuracy goal has a differential impact in the response 
strategy, with the focus put either on faster responses at the 
cost of accuracy, or vice versa. However, based on the 
study by Kossowska et al. (2014), we also predicted 
reduced switch costs in reaction times when following the 
speed goal. Contrary to this prediction, the switch costs 
were the same for both goals. The differences in the results 
between the two studies might have been caused by the 
differences in how goals were manipulated across studies. 
In the study by Kossowska et al., goals were manipulated 
between-subjects, meaning that participants did not change 
between the accuracy and the speed goal, but followed 
only one of the two goals throughout the entire experi-
ment. Apart from this difference, we also identified some 
methodological limitations in our procedure that might 
have influenced our results. These limitations are dis-
cussed in detail below. 
In addition to our primary results, exploratory 
analyses showed that the cost in accuracy associated with 
the speed goal was larger under the complete repetition 
condition when the task switched. The results suggest that 
induced speed is associated with more difficulties to 
update the stimulus-set binding under task conditions that 
require higher levels of flexibility, that is, when the task 
changes but the stimulus remains the same. This goes in 
line with a previous finding of Kossowska et al. (2014), 
which showed lower accuracy in the SCST under the speed 
goal, but only when it was necessary to update the 
available information, or more specifically, when there 
was a change in the stimulus from trial to trial. None-
theless, this last finding should be interpreted with caution, 
since the sample size of our experiment was small for the 
complexity of the exploratory analysis. In summary, the 
results from this experiment indicate that performance in 
a task-switching paradigm is impacted by the current 
Figure 3. Least-squares Means of Reaction Times and Error Rates as a Function of the Goals in Experiment 1. 
Error Bars Represent Standard Errors  
Note. Results are averaged on the level of task switch. LSMeans = Least-squares means. 
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goals, at least when those goals are framed in terms of 
speed and accuracy. However, previous evidence has 
found differences in switch costs as a function of the active 
goal (Kossowska et al., 2014), and we did not find such 
differences. 
As mentioned before, this experiment exposed some 
limitations of the procedure employed. First, the duration 
of the practice might not have been sufficient to ensure 
task automatization before engaging on each goal 
efficiently. The SCST is a complex task that requires 
learning several rules and associations, and in our 
experiment, participants completed only 8 practice trials 
before starting the experimental blocks with the goal 
manipulation. Second, the constant goal change might 
have imposed extra demands in the maintenance of 
a correct goal representation. The change between goals 
occurred after each experimental block, or, in other words, 
every 80 trials, and participants might not have had enough 
time to represent each goal and maintain an active 
representation of it. Third, the type of feedback that 
participants received might have had detrimental effects in 
the processes of goal engagement and active goal 
maintenance for the speed goal. Participants received 
auditory feedback after errors, but no information regard-
ing the quickness of their responses. Auditory feedback 
facilitates the learning of the task, but also makes salient 
the importance of accurate responses during the speed 
blocks. We addressed these three identified limitations in 
the second experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
This second experiment aimed at addressing the 
limitations found in the first experiment and therefore 
improve the experimental procedure used to evaluate the 
impact of goal maintenance and change on executive 
control. First, to ensure that participants were familiar with 
the task and could actively pursue each goal, we extended 
the practice session. Second, to facilitate the maintenance 
of each goal and guarantee that each goal was followed for 
a sufficient period of time, we introduced only one change 
of goals through the task. This way, participants completed 
two consecutive blocks following one goal, and two 
consecutive blocks following the other goal. Third, to help 
participants in the process of task automatization and make 
both goals equally salient, the feedback that participants 
received was modified: During the practice session, as in 
the procedure tested in the first experiment, participants 
received auditory feedback for errors; however, this time, 
during the experimental blocks, instead of auditory 
feedback, they received written information on their 
average reaction time (for the speed goal) or on their 
average accuracy (for the accuracy goal) at the end of each 
block. 
The hypothesis of this second experiment was the 
same as the one stated for the first experiment, that is, that 
the induction of speed and accuracy goals influences 
performance during the SCST. Specifically, when the 
speed goal was salient, we predicted a reduction in 
reaction times and in switch costs for reaction times, but at 
the cost of reduced accuracy. When the accuracy goal was 
salient, we predicted the opposite pattern: an increase in 
accuracy at the cost of larger reaction times and larger 
switch costs for reaction times. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 47 participants (32 females, 15 males), 
with a mean age of 23 years (SD = 5.31). The recruitment 
process took part through an online advertisement and via 
the university students’ pool. Participants gave their 
informed consent to participate in the study and received 
either money or course credits in exchange for their 
participation. This study complies with APA ethical 
standards and was approved by the ethical commission 
of Jagiellonian University. 
Goal Manipulation 
Participants completed a total of 4 experimental 
blocks following the same processing goals as in 
Experiment 1, speed and accuracy. In this second 
experiment, each goal was active for two consecutive 
blocks, and therefore the goal change occurred only once, 
between the second and the third experimental block (see 
Figure 1). We used the same instructions as in Experiment 
1, which were presented to participants before each 
experimental block (including before the blocks without 
goal change). Goal order was counterbalanced between 
participants. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli and general procedure were identical to 
Experiment 1. However, goals were manipulated differ-
ently. Participants completed a total of 6 blocks but, to 
ensure task automatization, the first two blocks were 
considered as practice. During these two blocks, partici-
pants heard a sound after incorrect responses and no goal 
was specified. Goals were manipulated in the remaining 
4 blocks, with two consecutive blocks dedicated to one 
goal (either speed or accuracy), and the remaining two 
blocks to the opposite goal (see Figure 1). During these 
experimental blocks, instead of auditory feedback, parti-
cipants received written information on their performance 
at the end of each block. The feedback provided in the 
4 experimental blocks was related to the goal that 
participants were following, that is, they received feedback 
on their average accuracy rate (accuracy blocks) or their 
average response time (speed blocks). 
Design and Data Analysis 
The design and analyses were identical to Experi-
ment 1. First, to test our main hypothesis, we ran an 
ANOVA with two within-subjects variables: goal (speed 
vs. accuracy) and task switch (switch vs. no switch). Then, 
we conducted a second ANOVA to explore the influence 
of goals in task-driven and stimulus-driven interference 
processing. For that, we included the task (age vs. gender) 
and the type of repetition (complete repetition vs. partial 
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repetition vs. complete alternation) as within-subject 
variables. Again, the task switch and the type of repetition 
variables were coded offline. 
Results 
Reaction Times 
One participant was excluded from the analysis due to 
a lower accuracy rate (M = 52%), and two participants 
were excluded due to missing data in some conditions. 
Therefore, the analyses were conducted with data from 
44 participants5. Only RTs from the experimental blocks 
(i.e., four blocks that included the goal manipulation) were 
considered for the analyses. Erroneous responses and RTs 
shorter than 200 ms and longer than 2000 ms, as well as 
the first trial of each block, were also excluded (altogether 
9.86%)6. On average, 288 trials from the total 360 trials 
per participant remained after filtering (SD = 23.56; range 
= 207 – 313)7. The proportion of valid trials considering 
the conditions of goal and task switch can be consulted in 
the Appendix (Table A), and the distribution of reaction 
times after filtering is depicted in Figure 4. 
To test our main hypothesis, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with two within-subject factors: goal 
(speed vs. accuracy) and task switch (switch vs. no 
switch). The main effect of goal was significant, F(1, 43) = 
35.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, as well as the main effect of 
task switch, F(1, 43) = 126, p < .001, ηp2 = .75, but not the 
interaction between goal and task switch, F(1, 43) = 0.76, 
p = .39, ηp2 = .02. Participants reacted faster when 
following the speed goal (M = 845 ms vs. M = 985 ms; see 
Figure 5), and under the non-switch condition (M = 867 ms 
vs. M = 963 ms). However, and contrary to our 
expectations, there were no differences in switch costs 
between the goals (Mspeed = 90 ms vs. Maccuracy = 101 ms). 
As in Experiment 1, we explored the impact of goals 
on the processing of task-driven and stimulus-driven 
interference. For that, we conducted a second ANOVA 
including the task (age vs. gender) and the type of 
repetition (complete repetition vs. partial repetition vs. 
complete alternation) as within-subject factors. Apart from 
the main effect of goal, F(1, 43) = 35.49, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.45, none of the effects of interest involving goal reached 
significance. It is important to note that the absence of 
interactions in the exploratory analysis needs to be 
considered with caution due to the sample size (see Table 
1 for the observed means in all conditions and the 
Appendix, Table B, for the complete exploratory analysis). 
Error Rates 
The mean error rate was 5.46%. First, we conducted 
a repeated measures ANOVA with two within-subject 
factors, goal and task switch (see Figure 4 for the 
distribution of the average error rates per participant and 
goal). The main effect of goal was significant, F(1, 43) = 
18.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, with higher error rates when the 
speed goal was salient (M = 8.16% vs. M = 2.60%; see 
Figure 5), as well as the main effect of task switch, F(1, 
43) = 18.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, with more errors in 
switching trials than in non-switching trials (M = 6.24% 
vs. M = 4.52%). The interaction Goal x Task switch was 
not significant, F(1, 43) = 2.24, p = .14, ηp2 = .05. 
Again, we explored the impact of goals on task-driven 
and stimulus-driven interference processing. For that, we 
conducted a second ANOVA including task and repetition 
type as within-subject factors. As in the confirmatory 
analysis, the main effect of goal was significant, F(1, 43) = 
20.15, p < .001, ηp2 =.32. Moreover, the interaction 
between goal and task switch was also significant, F(1, 43) 
= 7.54, p = .009, ηp2 = .15, with larger switch costs when 
following the speed goal compared to the accuracy goal 
(M = 3.32% vs. M = 1.04%). Lastly, there was a significant 
three-way interaction between goal, task and repetition 
type, F(2, 86) = 4.05, p = .021, ηp2 =.09. When following 
the speed goal, participants had more difficulties to 
perform the age categorization task under the complete 
Figure 4. Distribution of Filtered Reaction Times (Left) and Average Error Rates (Right) as a Function  
of the Goals in Experiment 2 
Note. Raincloud plots (Allen et al., 2019) of reaction times (RTs) and error rates as a function of the goals (accuracy, speed). The half violin plot 
represents the probability density function, and the jittered points are, in this case, either individual filtered RTs, or average error rates per participant 
and goal. Lines represent one standard deviation above and below the mean. Filtered RTs included correct responses that were longer than 200 ms and 
shorter than 2000 ms. The first trial of each block was also removed for RTs and error rates.  
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alternation condition (Mage = 11.6% vs. Mgender = 5.34%), t 
(215) = 5.02, p < .001, and under the partial repetition 
condition (Mage = 10.38% vs. Mgender = 7.41%), t(215) = 
2.39, p = .018. However, when following the accuracy 
goal, there were no differences between the tasks for any 
of the three types of repetition (all ps > .05). Again, we 
address the importance of considering the sample size 
when interpreting the results from this exploratory 
analysis. The observed means for all conditions are 
summarized in Table 1, and the complete results from 
the exploratory analysis can be consulted in the Appendix, 
Table B. 
Discussion  
The objective of the second experiment was to 
improve the experimental procedure used to measure the 
impact of processing goals on executive control. The 
results from the second experiment partially support our 
initial hypothesis: As in Experiment 1, participants 
adjusted their behaviour according to their current goals, 
with faster responses but lower accuracy when following 
the speed goal, and higher accuracy but slower responses 
when following the accuracy goal. Moreover, when the 
task and the type of repetition were controlled for in the 
exploratory analysis, participants showed smaller switch 
costs in accuracy when following the accuracy goal. 
However, we did not find the expected differences in 
switch costs for the reaction times neither in the 
confirmatory nor in the exploratory analysis. 
The results from this second study showed that goals 
also impacted the ability to update the stimulus-set 
binding, that is, the association between a specific stimulus 
and a categorization rule. The cost in accuracy associated 
with faster responses was more prominent when the task 
demands were higher, that is, when the stimuli changed 
completely or partially from trial to trial during the age 
categorization task. Age categorization requires a distinc-
tion between less well-determined classes (Mouchetant- 
Rostaing & Giard, 2003), and the change of stimulus (both 
complete and partial change) requires higher levels of 
cognitive flexibility. As with Experiment 1, we highlight 
the importance of interpreting carefully this last interaction 
from the exploratory analysis, due to the sample size of our 
study. 
COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENT 1 
AND EXPERIMENT 2 
Our goal was to study the impact of goal maintenance 
and goal change on the efficiency of executive control. For 
that, we modified and tested an existing task-switching 
paradigm, the SCST (Marzecová et al., 2013), across two 
experiments. In order to evaluate how goals influence 
executive control, the experimental procedure must meet 
two assumptions: First, the time dedicated to the pursuit of 
each goal before changing to a new goal has to be 
sufficient in order to observe changes in performance that 
are driven by the goal. Second, to measure the effects of 
goal change, the procedure must ensure the correct 
engagement on each goal; if there is no goal engagement, 
there will be no impact of changing goals because 
disengagement from any previous goal is not necessary. 
The two procedures employed in this study differed in 
the required duration of the goal maintenance and in the 
frequency with which the goals changed. The procedure 
tested in Experiment 1 included relatively frequent goal 
changes (hence, the maintenance of a given goal was 
relatively short), whereas the procedure tested in Experi-
Figure 5. Least-squares Means of Reaction Times and Error Rates as a Function of the Goals in Experiment 2. 
Error Bars Represent Standard Errors 
Note. Results are averaged on the level of task switch. LSMeans = Least-squares means. 
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ment 2 included less frequent goal changes (hence, the 
expected goal maintenance was longer). Below, we report 
the results of the omnibus analysis that included experi-
ment as a factor. 
Results 
Reaction Times 
We ran an ANOVA with two within-subject vari-
ables, goal (speed vs. accuracy) and task switch (switch 
vs. no switch), and one between-subject variable, experi-
ment (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2). The main effect of 
goal and the main effect of task switch were significant, 
F1(1, 87) = 83.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, F2(1, 87) = 241.58, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .74, as well as the main effect of 
experiment, F(1, 87) = 9.60, p = .003, ηp2 = .10, and the 
interaction between experiment and task switch, F(1, 87) = 
4.68, p = .033, ηp2 = .05. Those participants that 
completed the procedure changing goals frequently 
(Experiment 1) had, on average, larger response times 
(M = 1016 ms vs. M = 915 ms), as well as larger switch 
costs (M = 126 ms vs. M = 95 ms), compared to those 
participants who faced only one goal change during the 
experiment (Experiment 2). The complete analysis is 
summarized in Table 2. 
Error Rates 
The same analysis was conducted for error rates. The 
main effect of goal and the main effect of task switch were 
significant, F1(1, 87) = 24.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, 
F2(1, 87) = 26.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, as well as the 
interaction between experiment and goal, F(1, 87) = 6.84, 
p = .010, ηp2 = .07. Although participants in both 
experiments made fewer errors when following the 
accuracy goal than the speed goal, as shown in the 
analyses of each experiment, the effect was larger in 
Experiment 2. Looking at the interaction from another 
perspective, when participants followed the accuracy goal, 
they were less accurate when they had to change 
frequently between goals (Experiment 1) than when they 
only changed goals once (Experiment 2), t(126) = 2.87, p = 
.005. However, there were no significant differences 
between experiments when following the speed goal, 
t(126) = 0.58, p = .56. The complete analysis is 
summarized in Table 2. 
Discussion  
These results show that frequent goal changes in 
Experiment 1 had more detrimental effects on perfor-
mance, compared to the only one goal change in 
Experiment 2. Worse performance in Experiment 1 was 
observed in overall reaction times and in switch costs in 
reaction times. Moreover, frequent goal changes were also 
associated with smaller differences in accuracy between 
the goals, with lower accuracy when following the 
accuracy goal in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2. 
In general, it seems that frequent goal changes have 
a more negative impact on performance, and also impair 
the ability to follow an accuracy goal. The results from 
these analyses go in line with literature on multitasking 
showing larger performance difficulties when frequent 
goal changes take part, compared to when goals are 
followed sequentially (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012). 
However, there is a difference between our two procedures 
that needs to be considered when interpreting the reaction 
time results: the larger practice session of Experiment 2. 
Practice is associated with a reduction in reaction times 
and in switch costs (e.g., Karbach & Kray, 2009; Zinke et 
al., 2012), and could explain the differences in reaction 
times and switch costs between both experiments. This 
hypothesis could be tested in the future by increasing the 
practice session in the procedure used in Experiment 1 and 
comparing the results with those from Experiment 2. 
Overall, the second procedure might be more 
appropriate to measure the influence of goal maintenance 
and goal change on the efficiency of executive control, 
since it made possible the following of each goal without 
eliminating the goal changes. This does not mean that the 
procedure presented in the first experiment is not valid for 
other purposes, for example, to evaluate how individuals 
from groups associated with higher or lower efficiency in 
their executive control respond to frequent goal change 
Table 2. Summary of Omnibus Analyses Combining Experiment 1 and Experiment 2  
df ANOVA reaction times 
ANOVA 
error rates   
F ηp2 F ηp2 
Experiment 1, 87 9.60** .10 3.67 .04 
Goal 1, 87 83.79*** .49 24.31*** .22 
Task Switch 1, 87 241.58*** .74 26.28*** .23 
Experiment x Goal 1, 87 0.38 .00 6.84* .07 
Experiment x Task Switch 1, 87 4.68* .05 0.28 .00 
Goal x Task Switch 1, 87 0.14 .00 3.79 .04 
Experiment x Goal x Task Switch 1, 87 0.91 .01 0.09 .00  
Note. *p > .05; ** p > .01; ***p < .001 
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(e.g., bilinguals vs. monolinguals). Nonetheless, before 
using the procedure presented in Experiment 1, we would 
recommend its modification to include the extended 
practice and the changes in the feedback that were 
implemented in Experiment 2. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the last decades, research on motivation and goals 
has flourished, with a considerable number of studies 
exploring the impact of goals on human development and 
well-being, as well as its influence in different cognitive 
processes, including executive control. There is an 
agreement among the scientific community on the 
importance of executive control in the regulation of 
several other cognitive processes. However, the majority 
of studies in executive control have not taken into 
consideration the important role of goal maintenance and 
goal change in both the engagement in executive control 
and in performance during executive control tasks. The 
current paper reports two experiments that aimed at 
measuring the interaction between goals and executive 
control. For that, we modified the SCST (Marzecová et al., 
2013) by manipulating two goals, speed and accuracy. 
Our results show that, when the active goal requires 
quick responses, there is a reduction in reaction times but 
an increase in the number of errors. On the other hand, 
when the active goal requires accurate responses, the 
accuracy increases, but response times get longer. More-
over, in our second experiment, we found reduced switch 
costs in accuracy when following the accuracy goal, but 
only when controlling for task and type of repetition (i.e., 
in the exploratory analysis). Taken together, the results 
reveal that proactive engagement in processing goals 
influences human behaviour during the exertion of 
executive control. 
Apart from our main results, the exploratory analyses 
also suggested that following a speed goal was associated 
with more difficulties to update the stimulus-set binding 
(i.e., the association between a specific stimulus and 
a categorization rule), under specific experimental condi-
tions that required higher levels of cognitive flexibility. 
When the speed goal was salient in Experiment 1, we 
observed a decrease in accuracy when switching between 
tasks was required but the stimulus’ features remained 
identical (complete repetition condition). When the speed 
goal was salient in Experiment 2, the accuracy was lower 
when one specific aspect of the stimulus needed to be 
ignored (partial repetition condition), or when it was 
necessary to re-establish the stimulus-task binding (com-
plete alternation condition). The results suggest that goals 
impact not only general performance, but also the ability to 
update the available information related to the task and to 
the stimulus. Further studies are needed to clarify exactly 
under which conditions speed and accuracy goals impair or 
facilitate the processing of information that demands 
higher cognitive flexibility. 
Nonetheless, our hypothesis was not fully confirmed 
by the data. We did not find differences in switch costs for 
reaction times between the two goals in either of the two 
experiments. Previous literature has reported advantages in 
cognitive flexibility (i.e., reduced switch costs in reaction 
times) when speed goals are induced (Kossowska et al., 
2014), but such an advantage was not detected in our 
experiments. The main reason for this discrepancy could 
be the methodological differences between our study and 
the study by Kossowska et al. (2014). In the experiment 
conducted by Kossowska and colleagues, the processing 
goals were manipulated between subjects, meaning that 
participants did not change goals at any moment. 
Empirical evidence on multitasking and task switching 
has shown that goal change has a cost (e.g., Adler 
& Benbunan-Fich, 2012; Arrington & Logan, 2004; 
Gollan & Ferreira, 2009; Kiesel et al., 2010). The SCST 
is a difficult task in itself, and the inclusion of changes 
between processing goals probably incremented its com-
plexity. In fact, some studies have found a curvilinear 
relation between task demands and performance, with 
decreased efficiency under increased task demands 
(Kossowska, 2007b; Zivnuska et al., 2002). The difficulty 
of the SCST, together with the extra cost imposed by the 
goal changes, might have reduced the advantages in 
cognitive flexibility that are associated with speed goals. 
In conclusion, the results from both experiments 
illustrate the importance of processing goals on the 
efficiency of executive control. Although there were some 
differences between both experiments, probably as a result 
of how the goal changes were manipulated, the results go 
in the same line: following a speed goal (vs. an accuracy 
goal) increases the quickness of response, but impairs the 
accuracy and reduces the ability to update the stimulus-set 
binding, especially when the task demands are high. This 
suggests that goals affect the efficiency of executive 
control, at least when this efficiency is assessed through 
reaction times, error rates and switch costs in error rates. 
Comparison Between Procedures 
In this study, we aimed at measuring the impact of 
both goal maintenance and goal change on the efficiency 
of executive control and, more specifically, on task 
switching. The experimental procedure selected to fulfil 
this objective must allow the active engagement in each 
goal for a sufficient period of time to (1) observe its 
influence on participants’ behaviour and (2) measure the 
possible consequences of goal change. There are a few 
differences between the experimental procedures tested in 
this study that might play a role in the way in which goals 
affected performance. The most important difference is the 
number of goal changes. More frequent goal change 
implies shorter exposure to each goal, which might have 
negative consequences for the process of goal engagement. 
In the first experiment, participants changed goals after 
each experimental block, with a total of five changes, 
whereas in the second experiment the goal change 
occurred only once. 
When comparing the performance in both procedures, 
we observed that the frequent goal change (Experiment 1) 
was accompanied by longer reaction times and also larger 
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switch costs compared to a single goal change (Experiment 
2), suggesting that frequent goal changes hinder both 
general performance and cognitive flexibility. Never-
theless, as mentioned before, an alternative explanation 
could be considered: the extended practice of Experiment 
2 might be driving the differences between experiments in 
reaction times and switch costs for reaction times. Future 
studies including extended practice together with frequent 
goal changes will help to extract a clearer conclusion on 
the impact of multiple versus single goal changes in 
reaction times’ performance. Regarding the error rates 
analysis, frequent goal changes made the active main-
tenance of the accuracy goal harder, with higher error rates 
when following the accuracy goal in the first procedure 
compared to the second. Altogether, the comparison 
between the two procedures suggests that changing from 
one goal to another does not necessarily lead to 
deterioration of performance, but a larger number of 
changes might increase the task demands and complicate 
the process of goal maintenance. 
As discussed previously, our second procedure might 
be more adequate to measure how goal maintenance and 
goal change influence the efficiency of executive control. 
The results of the comparison between both procedures 
indicate a stronger goal engagement in Experiment 2, 
which in consequence allows the introduction of a mean-
ingful goal change. In addition, the second procedure 
addressed some limitations that were detected after testing 
the first procedure, increasing the practice and modifying 
the feedback that participants received. 
Contributions of this Study and Future Directions 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that measures 
the impact of goal maintenance together with goal change 
on executive control. In both experiments, we found 
differences in performance driven by the experimental 
manipulation of the goals, despite testing young adults, 
a group that is on their peak capacities in terms of 
executive control and is less vulnerable to experimental 
manipulations during executive control tasks. The fact that 
our manipulations were successful among this population 
indicates that the task can be used in other groups with 
larger variability in their executive control, as bilinguals, 
musicians, or video game players. Task-switching studies 
have found that individuals from these particular groups 
might have a greater ability to follow the task goals and to 
switch between them (for bilinguals and musicians see e. 
g., Marzecová et al., 2013; Moradzadeh et al., 2015; Prior 
& MacWhinney, 2010; for video game players see e.g., 
Shawn Green et al., 2012; Strobach et al., 2012). 
Following this idea, bilinguals, musicians, or video game 
players might also engage more effectively on processing 
goals, showing larger behavioural differences depending 
on the goal they follow (e.g., a larger reduction in reaction 
times when following speed vs. accuracy goals). They 
might be also more resistant to the impact of goal changes, 
being able to change goals more efficiently, even when 
this change occurs with relative high frequency. Both 
procedures could be used to test these hypotheses, that is, 
the ability of these individuals to maintain and change 
goals effectively (procedure from Experiment 2), as well 
as their ability to adjust to frequent goal changes 
(procedure from Experiment 1 after implementing changes 
on the practice length and the type of feedback). 
Limitations 
There are some limitations of this research that must 
be taken into consideration. First of all, although the sample 
size in both experiments was sufficient for the confirmatory 
analyses, as the power analysis for Experiment 1 and the 
sensitivity analysis for Experiment 2 indicated, a larger 
sample size would certainly increase the power of the 
analyses. Second, for now, our results cannot be extra-
polated to goals other than speed and accuracy, neither can 
they be generalized to other aspects of executive control 
than flexibility. Further research is needed to include the 
manipulation of other goals (e.g., categorization vs. 
individuation goals, cooperation vs. competition goals, 
high vs. low levels of motivation to control prejudice) and 
measure their impact on cognitive flexibility but also on 
different executive control processes. 
Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the evidence presented in this paper 
illustrates that goals modulate the efficiency of executive 
control. Induced speed and accuracy goals influenced 
general task performance as well as the control of 
interference in the SCST, a switching paradigm that 
requires the categorization of social stimuli. The results 
from this study indicate the importance of considering 
different types of goals when conducting research on 
executive control, and evaluate not only the possible 
impact of goal maintenance processes, but also of goal 
disengagement and reengagement. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 We calculated the minimum recommended sample size for the 
confirmatory analysis, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, using 
G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007). The within-subject factors were goal 
(speed vs. accuracy) and task switch (switch vs. no switch). For an effect 
size (Cohen’s f) of 0.20, an alpha of .05 and power of .80, a minimum 
sample of 36 participants was required. 
2 The confirmatory and exploratory reaction time analyses of both 
experiments were repeated with two subject-specific cut-offs. Rather than 
removing RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 2000 ms, we removed 
RTs shorter than 200 ms and then RTs that were 2.5 and 3 standard 
deviations above and below the mean. The results of the analyses 
remained identical regardless of the type of cut-off criterion applied. 
3 To reduce the influence of the previous goal, the confirmatory 
analyses of both experiments were repeated removing the first 20% of 
trials of each block (i.e., 16 trials), instead of only the first trial. The 
results of these analyses were identical to those reported in this 
manuscript. 
4 The average completion time for each experimental block in 
Experiment 1 was approximately 04:50 minutes, with faster completion 
times for the blocks in which the speed goal was salient (04:44 minutes 
approximately) compared to the blocks in which the accuracy goal was 
salient (04:56 minutes approximately). 
5 The analyses of Experiment 2 were identical to the analyses of 
Experiment 1, and therefore no power analysis was conducted prior data 
collection. However, a post-hoc sensitivity analysis revealed that the 
minimum detectable effect size (Cohen’s f) for a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA (Goal x Task switch), with a sample size of 44 participants, an 
alpha of .05 and a power of .80, was .18. The smallest significant effect 
size (partial Eta-squared) reported in the confirmatory analyses of 
Experiment 2 was .30, which corresponds to a Cohen’s f of .65. 
6 After trimming the data for RTs analysis, two participants had only 
one observation in one of the experimental conditions considered for the 
exploratory analysis (i.e., goal, task, repetition type, and task switch). The 
RTs analyses (both confirmatory and exploratory) were repeated 
excluding those participants, with no changes in the results. 
7 The average completion time for each experimental block in 
Experiment 2 was approximately 04:45 minutes, with faster completion 
times for the two consecutive blocks in which the speed goal was salient 
(04:37 minutes per block approximately) compared to the two 
consecutive blocks in which the accuracy goal was salient (04:54 
minutes per block approximately). 
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